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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ms. Munson appeals from her judgment of conviction, arguing: (1) the district court
abused its discretion in allowing the State to introduce evidence and testimony relating to a civil
settlement agreement entered into by Ms. Munson and Pioneer Title (“the Agreement”); (2) the
district court abused its discretion in not allowing Ms. Munson to introduce, in rebuttal, expert
testimony regarding a polygraph examination she took which indicated she was truthful; and
(3) the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced Ms. Munson to a term of
incarceration, considering the substantial mitigating factors that exist in this case. Ms. Munson
submits this Reply Brief to respond to the State’s legal argument on these issues, and to provide
further authority on the question of first impression presented in this case, which is whether
Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 applies in criminal cases.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Munson included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in her opening brief,
which she relies on and incorporates herein. (Appellant’s Br., pp.1-4).
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing the State to introduce evidence and
testimony relating to the Agreement during its case-in-chief and to argue at trial that the
Agreement constituted consciousness of guilt?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by not allowing Ms. Munson to introduce in
rebuttal evidence regarding a polygraph examination Ms. Munson took which indicated
she was truthful?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Ms. Munson to an aggregate
unified term of twenty years, with four years fixed, considering the significant mitigating
factors that exist in this case?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The State To Introduce Evidence And
Testimony Relating To The Agreement During Its Case-In-Chief And To Argue At Trial That
The Agreement Constituted Consciousness Of Guilt
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Ms. Munson’s pretrial motion under Idaho Rule of Evidence

408, and granted the State’s pretrial motion under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), ruling the
State could present evidence and testimony relating to the Agreement during its case-in-chief,
and could argue in closing that the Agreement constituted “consciousness of guilt.” (R., pp.36162.) In her Appellant’s Brief, Ms. Munson argued the district court abused its discretion, as it did
not act consistently with Rule 404(b) and Rule 408, and did not reach its decision by an exercise
of reason. (Appellant’s Br., pp.6-12.) The State argues the district court did not abuse its
discretion and, even if the court did err, the error was harmless. (Respondent’s Br., p.5.) This
Court must reject the State’s argument.

B.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With Rule 408 Because This Court Should
Hold Rule 408 Applies To Criminal Cases
As an initial matter, the State correctly sets forth the version of Rule 408 applicable at the

time this case was decided.1 (Respondent’s Br., p.12.) Rule 408 stated, at the time of the trial in
this case:
Evidence of (1) furnishing, offering, or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting,
offering, or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the
claim or any other claim. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
1

Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 was amended effective July 1, 2018, to include sections and
subsections, but the substance of the rule was not changed.
3

negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of
any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course
of compromise negotiations. This rule does not require exclusion if the evidence
is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness,
negat[ing] a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation or prosecution. Compromise negotiations encompass mediation.
The State did not seek to admit evidence of the Agreement for any of the permissible reasons set
forth in Rule 408 (to prove bias or prejudice or a witness, to negate a contention of undue delay,
or to prove an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution). Instead, the State sought
to introduce evidence of the Agreement to show Ms. Munson wrongfully took money from
Pioneer Title. (R., pp.152-53.) This is a prohibited use under Rule 408, and the district court
erred in permitting the State to introduce evidence relating to the Agreement at Ms. Munson’s
trial.
On this question of first impression, Ms. Munson argued in her Appellant’s Brief that this
Court should hold that evidence of compromise of civil liability should be excluded in both civil
and criminal cases because such a policy promotes settlement of civil disputes. (Appellant’s
Br., pp.10-12.) In its Respondent’s Brief, the State discusses the federal circuit split over whether
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 applies in criminal proceedings. (Respondent’s Br., pp.12-14) The
State acknowledges, however, that in light of a 2006 amendment to the Federal Rules, it is now
clear that Federal Rule 408 applies in civil and criminal cases. (Respondent’s Br., p.13, n.3, 4.)
Indeed, the 2006 amendment to Federal Rule 408 “made clear that the rule applied to both civil
and criminal proceedings” but “drew a distinction between civil disputes involving the
government and civil disputes involving private parties.” United States v. Davis, 596 F.3d 852,
860 (D.C. Cir. 2010). “Under amended [Federal] Rule 408, a defendant’s statements in
settlement negotiations with government agencies may be admitted in a criminal case. But if the
civil dispute was with a private party, the defendant’s offer of settlement and statements made in
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negotiation may not be admitted in a criminal prosecution when offered to prove liability for,
invalidity of, or amount of a claim.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Advisory Committee’s Note to the 2006 Amendment to Federal Rule 408 makes it
clear that the purpose of Federal Rule 408 is to promote settlement of civil claims. The Advisory
Committee states the rule “has been amended to settle some questions in the courts about [its]
scope . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 408, advisory committee’s note (2006 amend.). The Advisory
Committee recognizes that a private party engaging in compromise negotiations with a
government agency can protect against the use of their statements in a subsequent criminal case
by way of private ordering, but a private party engaging in compromise negotiations with
another private party cannot. Id. “The inability to guarantee protection against subsequent use
could lead to parties refusing to admit fault, even if by doing so they could favorably settle the
private matter.” Id. “Such a chill on settlement negotiations would be contrary to the policy of
Rule 408.” Id. Notably, Federal Rule 408 was amended again in 2011 for stylistic purposes only.
Fed. R. Evid. 408, advisory committee’s note (2011 amend.). There was “no intent to change any
result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.” Id.
Despite the fact it is now clear that Federal Rule 408 would bar, in a criminal case, any
evidence relating to a prior civil settlement agreement entered into by private parties, the State
argues this Court should hold that Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 should not apply to criminal cases
because it “is better reasoned.” (Respondent’s Br., p.14.) The State relies in part on a case from
the Utah Supreme Court, State v. Mead, 27 P.3d 1115 (Utah 2001). In considering whether
Utah’s counterpart to Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 applies in criminal and civil proceedings, the
Mead Court found the plain language of its rule to be ambiguous, but was persuaded by the
reasoning of Manko v. United States, 87 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1996). Mead, 27 P.3d at 1127. In
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Manko, the defendant attempted to introduce evidence of a civil settlement with the IRS which
undermined several of the government’s allegations that the defendant had committed tax fraud.
87 F.3d at 52. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held the evidence was admissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 (pre-2006 amendment) noting “[t]he public interest in the
disclosure and prosecution of crime is surely greater than the public interest in the settlement of
civil disputes.” Id. But even the post-2006 Federal Rules of Evidence would allow the admission
of a defendant’s statement made in settlement negotiations with a government agency unless the
defendant negotiated otherwise through private ordering. See Davis, 596 F.3d at 860. Thus, even
if this Court finds the reasoning of Manko persuasive, it should not follow the lead of Utah’s
Supreme Court in Mead.
The better approach is for this Court to conclude that Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 applies
to civil and criminal proceedings. Nothing in Rule 408 states it is inapplicable to criminal
proceedings, and the Idaho Rules of Evidence generally apply to both civil and criminal
proceedings. See I.R.E. 101 (stating, with certain exceptions not relevant here, the Idaho Rules of
Evidence “govern all cases and proceedings in the courts of the State of Idaho”). The public
policy favoring the promotion of civil settlement is furthered by interpreting Rule 408 as
applying to criminal cases. As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized in a pre-2006
amendment case, “[i]t is self-evident that a defendant in a civil suit is far less likely to offer to
settle a claim if evidence of that offer can later be introduced to prove criminal liability for the
same conduct.” United States v. Arias, 431 F.3d 1327, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005).
Moreover, a “basic premise underlying [Federal] Rule 408” is that “evidence of
compromise is not necessarily probative of liability.” Id. Indeed, the advisory committee notes to
the pre-2006 version of Federal Rule 408 indicate that “evidence of a settlement offer is often
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irrelevant to liability for the charged conduct, because ‘the [settlement] offer may be motivated
by a desire for peace rather than from any concession of weakness of position.’” Arias, 431 F.3d
at 1337 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 408, advisory committee’s note (1972 proposed rules)). “In this
light, permitting the admission of civil settlement offers in subsequent criminal prosecutions
actually compromises the accuracy of the jury’s determination.” Id.
This Court should interpret Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 to apply to both criminal and
civil proceedings, and hold that all evidence relating Agreement should have been excluded at
Ms. Munson’s trial. Because the district court concluded evidence of the Agreement was
admissible notwithstanding Rule 408, its decision was an abuse of discretion. See State v.
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (stating a district court abuses its discretion when, among
other things, it does not “act[ ] within the outer boundaries of [its] discretion and consistently
with any legal standards applicable to specific choices”).

C.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With Rule 404(b) Because The Fact That
Ms. Munson Entered Into The Agreement Is Not Evidence of “Other Crimes, Wrongs, Or
Acts” Within The Meaning Of Rule 404(b) And Is Not Evidence Of Consciousness Of
Guilt
As in initial matter, the State correctly points out that the question of whether evidence is

admissible under Rule 404(b) for a purpose other than propensity is given free review by this
Court, as set forth in State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51 (2009). (Respondent’s Br., pp.5-6.) Here,
the district court concluded the Agreement was admissible under Rule 404(b) because it found
“there was sufficient evidence from which a fact finder could conclude that the acts occurred”
and the Agreement was relevant to a disputed issue other than propensity—specifically,
consciousness of guilt. (R., p.362.) The district court erred in its legal conclusion, which is
reviewed de novo on appeal. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 51; see also State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,
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190 (Ct. App. 2011) (“[W]hen considering admission of evidence of prior bad acts, we exercise
free review of the trial court’s relevancy determination”). The fact that Ms. Munson entered into
the Agreement is not evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” within the meaning of Rule
404(b).
In determining whether evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), the first question for a
trial court to consider is “whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad acts as
fact.” State v. Naranjo, 152 Idaho 134, 138 (Ct. App. 2011). Ms. Munson argued in her
Appellant’s Brief that the district court never should have proceeded past this initial inquiry
because the fact that she agreed to pay approximately $1.3 million to Pioneer Title in exchange
for Pioneer Title’s agreement not to pursue civil claims against her is not a prior bad act within
the meaning of Rule 404(b). (Appellant’s Br., pp.8-10.) The State asserts “the 404(b) prior act
was Munson’s agreement to repay and eventual repayment of the money.” (Respondent’s
Br., p.10.) But evidence that Ms. Munson entered into a settlement agreement to resolve
potential civil liability is not evidence of “other crimes, wrong, or acts” within the meaning of
Rule 404(b) because it does not reflect negatively on her character.
Rule 404(b) recognizes that evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” may bear upon a
defendant’s character, and may be admissible for a purpose other than showing that the
defendant acted in accordance with that character. But Rule 404(b) is limited to crimes, wrongs,
and acts that reflect negatively on a person’s character. As the Court of Appeals recently
explained, the term “acts” as used in Rule 404(b) “encompasses acts similar in nature to crimes
or wrongs and which invoke propensity toward such actions and related bad character.” State v.
Sams, 160 Idaho 917, 920 (Ct. App. 2016). This is because, “[a]s to the context of words, Idaho
appellate courts have applied the maxim noscitur a sociis, which means a word is known by the
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company it keeps.” Id. at 920, n.3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen words
appear in a list or are otherwise associated, they should be given related meanings.” Id. at 920,
n.3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, evidence that Ms. Munson entered into a civil
settlement agreement to resolve potential civil claims does not implicate her character, and is
thus not encompassed within the “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” language in Rule 404(b). See
State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 949 (Ct. App. 2012).
Moreover, to the extent that Ms. Munson’s payment of money to Pioneer Title represents
a crime, wrong, or act, it is not an “other” crime, wrong, or act within the meaning of Rule
404(b), as it is the based on the same conduct which formed the basis of the criminal charges.
The district court erred in concluding the Agreement was governed by Rule 404(b).

D.

Ms. Munson Is Entitled To A New Trial Because The State Cannot Prove The District
Court’s Error Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Because Ms. Munson objected to the admission of evidence and testimony relating to the

Agreement in the district court, the State has the burden of demonstrating the district court’s
error in admitting the evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 222 (2010). “To hold an error harmless, this Court must declare a belief, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of
contributed to the conviction.” State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 466 (Ct. App. 2010). The State
cannot meet its burden of showing there was no reasonable possibility that evidence and
testimony relating to the Agreement contributed to Ms. Munson’s conviction for grand theft.
Courts have recognized consciousness of guilty is second only to a confession in terms of
probative value. See United States v. Meling, 47 F.3d 1546, 1557 (9th Cir. 1995); see
also Cook v. State, 157 Idaho 775, 780, 339 P.3d 1179, 1184 (Ct. App. 2014) (noting evidence of
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defendant’s consciousness of guilt was damaging to his case). The State argued in the district
court that the Agreement was “relevant to showing that the taking was wrongful.” (R., pp.15253.) The State argued that “[w]hen the jury hears that the defendant, a CPA, agreed to repay
approximately $1,300,000.00 to the victim after being caught, the jury could then make the
logical inference that the defendant knew of the theft.” (R., p.153.) The “logical inference”
suggested by the State surely contributed to Ms. Munson’s conviction.
Ms. Munson did not dispute that she received certain payroll advances that were not
deducted at the end of the month, as charged in Count I; she did not dispute that she did not
contribute to her health care benefits and her employer-sponsored 401k, as charged in Count II;
and she did not dispute that she received the three bonus checks at issue in Count III. The only
question with respect to these three counts was whether Ms. Munson had the requisite criminal
intent—that is, whether her taking was wrongful. See I.C. § 18-2403(1). With respect to Count I,
she argued there was no evidence she did anything to cause the payroll errors, or was aware of
the payroll errors, prior to May 2014. (R., pp.985, 995.) With respect to Count II, she argued
there was no evidence she caused the deductions not to be taken. (R., p.989.) With respect to
Count III, she argued the bonus checks at issue were authorized discretionary bonuses.
(R., p.990.)
Ms. Munson argued in closing that “[t]he State will argue simply that her repaying per
the Settlement Agreement with Pioneer Title is evidence of criminal intent.” (R., p.995.) This is
precisely what the State did. With respect to Count I, the State argued Ms. Munson “chose to
repay Pioneer Holding $1,300,000.00 in restitution for the amount she had stolen from them.”
(R., p.951.) With respect to Count II, the State argued “the defendant stole over a million dollars
from Pioneer Title and she knew it which is why she agreed to pay back 1.3 million through a
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settlement upon her termination.” (R., p.964.) With respect to Count III, the State argued “the
defendant repaid Pioneer Holding $1,300,000 to Pioneer Holding related to these checks.”
(R., p.970.) It is clear from the parties’ closing arguments that evidence relating to the
Agreement was a significant component of the State’s case.
The State argues that Ms. Munson’s acquittal on the forgery count shows the Agreement
had no improper effect on the verdict. (Respondent’s Br., p.17.) But the forgery count differed
significantly from the grand theft counts as it did not relate to Ms. Munson’s receipt of funds. In
Count IV, the State alleged Ms. Munson created and/or used a forged signature stamp to pass
checks without Mr. Bundgard’s knowledge or permission. (R., p.25.) Ms. Munson argued the
rubber stamp in question was not forged, but was created for business purposes, and was
authorized for business use. (R., p.994.) The State did not refer at all to the Agreement in its
closing argument on Count IV. (R., pp.971-76.) The fact that Ms. Munson was acquitted of
forgery actually reveals how important the Agreement was in contributing to Ms. Munson’s
grand theft convictions.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in United States v. Bailey that “the potential
prejudicial effect of the admission of evidence of a settlement can be more devastating to a
criminal defendant than to a civil litigant.” 327 F.3d 1131, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003). Such is the
case here. The State cannot meet its burden of showing the district court’s error in admitting
evidence relating to the Agreement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and Ms. Munson is
therefore entitled to a new trial.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Allowing Ms. Munson To Introduce In
Rebuttal Expert Testimony Regarding A Polygraph Examination Ms. Munson Took Which
Indicated She Was Truthful In Her Denials Of Wrongdoing
A.

Introduction
In her Appellant’s Brief, Ms. Munson argued the district court abused its discretion in

excluding the proffered polygraph evidence because the purpose of this evidence was not simply
to bolster her credibility, but to rebut evidence of her alleged consciousness of guilt, thus
distinguishing this case from State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520 (2003). (Appellant’s Br., pp.12-17.)
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State faults Ms. Munson for “essentially ignor[ing] the decades-old
line of precedent holding that results of polygraph examinations are inadmissible absent a
stipulation by both parties.” (Respondent’s Br., p.19 (quotation marks and citation omitted).) The
State also argues Perry “does not help Munson” because she “fails to show that in Idaho,
polygraph evidence is admissible to show subjective consciousness of innocence.”
(Respondent’s Br., p.22 (quotation marks and citation omitted).) Finally, the State argues that if
the district court erred in excluding the polygraph evidence, its error was harmless.
(Respondent’s Br., pp.22-23.) This Court should reject the State’s arguments.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Excluding The Proffered Polygraph Evidence
In her motion to reconsider, Ms. Munson relied principally on Perry in arguing the

polygraph examiner should be permitted to testify regarding the examination he administered to
Ms. Munson to rebut any evidence or testimony presented by the State as to Ms. Munson’s
consciousness of guilt, state of mind, intent, absence of mistake, motive, or common scheme or
plan. (R., pp.771-72.) Ms. Munson framed the issue as a question of first impression in Idaho
regarding the use of polygraph evidence to rebut consciousness of guilt. (R., p.772.) The district
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court denied Ms. Munson’s motion to reconsider. (Tr., p.663, L.23 – p.664, L.6.) The district
court ruled it would not permit the defense to use the polygraph evidence for the purposes
outlined, which it understood “to be the same as bolstering the credibility of the defendant.”
(Tr., p.664, Ls.13-20.) The district court did not act consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices before it, and thus abused its discretion. See Hedger, 115 Idaho
at 600. As argued by Ms. Munson in her Appellant’s Brief, evidence of subjective consciousness
of innocence is relevant to show a lack of guilty knowledge, and this case is thus not controlled
by Perry. (See Appellant’s Br., pp.12-17.)

C.

Ms. Munson Is Entitled To A New Trial On Count III Because The State Cannot Prove
The District Court’s Error Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Because Ms. Munson moved to admit the polygraph evidence in the district court, the

State has the burden of demonstrating the district court’s error in excluding the evidence was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Perry, 150 Idaho at 222. “To hold an error harmless, this
Court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility
that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.” Pokorney, 149 Idaho at 466. The
State cannot meet its burden of showing there was no reasonable possibility that the proffered
polygraph evidence contributed to Ms. Munson’s conviction on Count III.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argues that even if the district court erred in excluding
the proffered polygraph evidence, the error was harmless because Ms. Munson’s subjective
consciousness of innocence “was already before the district court.” (Respondent’s Br., pp.22-23.)
The State contends Ms. Munson’s willingness to testify showed the same consciousness of
innocence as her willingness to take a polygraph examination. (Respondent’s Br., p.23.) The
State is incorrect.
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As other courts have recognized, a defendant’s willingness to take a polygraph
examination is relevant to an assessment of the defendant’s state of mind so long as the
defendant believes the test is accurate. See, e.g., State v. Pfaff, 676 N.W.2d 562, 568-69 (Wis.
App. 2004). There is a meaningful difference in subjecting oneself to a scientific test (if you
believe the science) as compared to opening oneself up to cross-examination at trial. The fact
that the district court excluded evidence that Ms. Munson was willing to take, and did take, a
polygraph examination addressing whether the bonus checks at issue were authorized could
reasonably have affected the outcome on Count III.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Ms. Munson To An Aggregate
Unified Term Of Twenty Years, With Four Years Fixed, Considering The Significant Mitigating
Factors That Exist In This Case
A.

Introduction
On this issue, Ms. Munson relies largely on the argument contained in her Appellant’s

Brief. (See Appellant’s Br., pp.17-22.) She includes this section here only to address an argument
made by the State in its Respondent’s Brief.

B.

Ms. Munson Paid Pioneer Title Back More Than It Was Entitled To Receive In Order To
Resolve Any Civil Claims Against Her, Thinking She Could Then Move On With Her
Life, And The District Court Did Not Adequately Consider This Fact At Sentencing
The State contends Ms. McClure’s testimony regarding the amount of Pioneer Title’s loss

($884,000 as opposed to $1.3 million) “should carry no weight” because the number was “a shot
in the dark” as evidenced by Ms. McClure’s admission that she did not have a list of supporting
documents that Pioneer Title used in calculating its loss. (Respondent’s Br., p.27.) Ms. McClure
did not have a list of supporting documents because they were never provided to Ms. Munson.
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Ms. McClure testified that Pioneer Title never conducted a forensic audit to determine the
amount of money attributable to the payroll errors that formed the basis of the grand theft
allegations in Counts I and II. (4/28/17 Tr., p.26, L.13 – p.27, L.20.) Ms. McClure testified that,
at best, Pioneer Title conduct a “forensic investigation,” which resulting in “a series of schedules
and some supporting documentation.” (4/28/17 Tr., p.27, L.21 – p.28, L.6.) Ms. McClure asked
Pioneer Title for the original payroll reports, more documentation regarding Ms. Munson’s
insurance plan elections, and documentation on bonuses, and was told “they didn’t exist.”
(4/28/17 Tr., p.29, L.9 – p.30, L.17.) Ms. McClure testified that based on her review of Pioneer
Title’s documentation, Ms. Munson received $884,000 from Pioneer Title that was not
authorized as alleged in the grand theft counts. (4/28/17 Tr., p.31, L.9 – p.33, L.10.)
The State claims it “demands far too much of the imagination” to think Ms. Munson
would pay back Pioneer Tile more than it owed and argues it is “nonsensical” to think she
overpaid Pioneer Title. (Respondent’s Br., p.28.) It is, in fact, completely sensible, and reveals
the extreme injustice in this case. Ms. Munson does not dispute that she received money from
Pioneer Title that was not authorized, in the form of payroll advances and health insurance
premiums. But, at every point, from when she was first confronted with these irregularities by
Pioneer Title to when she testified at trial, Ms. Munson has denied knowing she was wrongfully
receiving these funds. She agreed to settle any potential civil claims against her in order to do the
right thing and move on with her life, and to avoid the cost and risk inherent in civil litigation.
Ms. Munson told the district court she agreed to pay Pioneer Title the money it requested
because, among other things, had Pioneer Title succeeded on a breach of fiduciary duty claim,
she could have been required to reimburse Pioneer Title for all of the compensation she received
over the course of her 23-year employment. (Tr., p.1270, Ls.11-13, p.1272, Ls.8-12; R., p.283.)
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Terry Copple, a consulting attorney for Pioneer Title, acknowledged on cross-examination at
trial that he sent a draft civil lawsuit to Ms. Munson while they were negotiating the terms of the
civil settlement, and threatened in that suit to go after all of Ms. Munson’s compensation. (Tr.,
p.1250, L.12 – p.1251, L.24, p.1270, Ls.5-13, p.1272, Ls.8-12.)
Ms. Munson never expected she would be charged criminally after paying Pioneer Title
back more than it owed. And she certainly never expected she would be found guilty, without a
forensic audit ever having been conducted, knowing she never did anything wrong. Ms. Munson
contends the district court abused its discretion at sentencing.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in her Appellant’s Brief,
Ms. Munson respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction and remand this case to
the district court for a new trial. Alternatively, Ms. Munson requests that this Court reduce her
sentence as it deems appropriate, or remand this case to the district court for a new sentencing
hearing.
DATED this 31st day of January, 2019.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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